We shall begin our examination of skepticism with a
doctrine known as universal skepticism. While few philosophers or theologians
explicitly adhere to this position, its basic theme often arises in less
sweeping varieties of skepticism. By noting the flaws of universal skepticism,
we are able to arrive at the general principles with which to answer other
skeptical objections to knowledge.
Universal skepticism is usually stated in one of two ways. In its positive form it consists of the doctrine that man can know nothing. This belief can be easily dismissed, because anyone who defends it finds himself immersed in hopeless absurdities. In asserting that there is no knowledge, the skeptic is asserting a knowledge claim—which according to his own theory is impossible. The universal skeptic wishes to claim truth for a theory that denies man’s ability to arrive at truth, and this puts the skeptic in the unenviable position of uttering nonsense. Indeed, he cannot even begin to argue for his position, because the “possibility of knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of argument, in the very possibility of having recourse to reasons.”8 As Francis Parker explains:
There is such a thing as knowledge. The assertion of this proposition is necessarily true if there is to be any assertion at all, for its contradictory is self-contradictory. If the assertion “There is no knowledge” is true, then it is false, for that assertion itself purports to be an instance of knowledge. Thus the only alternative to the recognition of the existence of knowledge is, as Aristotle said, a return to the vegetative state where no assertions whatever can be made.9
The second form of universal skepticism consists of the doctrine that we
must doubt every alleged instance of knowledge. Through this negative
formulation, the universal skeptic seeks to avoid the contradiction of
asserting a knowledge claim while denying the existence of knowledge. But the
doctrine that we should doubt every knowledge claim translates into the
positive assertion that man can never attain certainty—and this version of skepticism
fares no better than the preceding.
We must ask if this “principle of
universal doubt” is itself certain, or is it open to doubt as well? If it is known with
certainty, at least one thing is beyond doubt, which makes the principle false.
If, however, the principle is open to doubt—i.e., if it is not certain—then on
what grounds can the skeptic claim greater plausibility for his theory than any
other? The logician C. N. Bittle elaborates on this
problem:
Either skeptics have valid reasons for their universal doubting, or they have no valid reasons for it. If they have valid reasons, they surely know something that is valid, and they no longer are real skeptics. If they have no valid reasons, they have no reason to doubt. In the first case their position is inconsistent, and in the second case their position is irrational. Whichever way they turn, their position is untenable.10
Why, according to the universal skeptic, should every
knowledge claim be doubted? “Because,” he will reply, “man is capable
of error, and it is possible in any given instance that he has committed an
error.” We must remember, however, that “error” (or falsehood) is the opposite
of “truth”—and the skeptic who appeals to error implicitly admits that a proposition
cannot be true and false, correct and incorrect, at the same time and in the
same respect. Thus, whether he likes it or not, the skeptic must surrender to
the logical principle known as the Law of Contradiction (which states that a
proposition cannot be true and false at the same time and in the same respect).
As a barest minimum, therefore, the skeptic must concede the validity of the
Law of Contradiction and its corollaries: the Law of Identity (A is A, a thing
is itself) and the Law of the Excluded Middle (something is either A or not-A).
Here we must note the main source of confusion in the skeptical approach:
the equation of knowledge and certainty with infallibility. When the
skeptic claims that every knowledge claim should be doubted
because man is capable of making mistakes, he is simply pointing out the
obvious: that man is a fallible being. No one, not even the most resolute
anti-skeptic, will deny the point that man is fallible. (We must wonder,
though, how the skeptic arrived at this knowledge. Is he certain that
man is fallible?)
The skeptic fails to realize that it is precisely man’s fallibility that
generates the need for a science of knowledge. If man were infallible—if all
knowledge were given to him without the slightest
possibility of error—then the need for epistemological
guidelines with which to verify ideas, with which to sort the true from the
false, would not arise. Man requires a method to minimize the possibility of
error, and this is the function of epistemology. A science of knowledge enables
us to discriminate between justified and unjustified beliefs; and since the
beliefs of an infallible being would not stand in need of verification, he
could have no use for epistemological standards. Where infallibility is
involved, concepts such as truth, falsity, certainty and uncertainty are stripped of any possible application.
Consider the basic argument of the skeptic. We have seen that fallibility
gives rise to epistemological guidelines used to distinguish truth from
falsity, certainty from uncertainty, and so forth. The skeptic, however, starts
from the same premise—that man is fallible—and uses it to argue that man can never
achieve truth and certainty. It is because man is capable of error that he must
distinguish truth from falsehood, certainty from doubt. “But,” argues the
skeptic, “it is because man is capable of error that he can never attain truth
and certainty.”
The skeptic thus turns epistemology
on its head by using the foundation for a science of knowledge—human
fallibility—as a weapon to argue, in effect, that a science of knowledge is
impossible to man.
Even if the universal skeptic could consistently adhere to his position
(which he cannot), his victory would be an empty one. His claim that man cannot
acquire knowledge and certainty reduces to the claim that man is fallible—and
this tells us nothing new, except that the skeptic prefers to use epistemological
terms while totally ignoring their context.
Since man is not infallible, any concepts of “knowledge” or “certainty”
that require infallibility are, for that very reason, inapplicable to man and totally
irrelevant to human epistemology. Even if the skeptical position made sense,
it would fail to tell us anything concerning human knowledge and human
certainty—which removes it from the realm of serious consideration.
In summary, we have indicted universal skepticism on two counts: first,
because it cannot be maintained without contradiction and, second, because it
commits what we shall hereafter refer to as the “infallibilist
fallacy”—i.e., the equation of epistemological terms, such as “knowledge” and
“certainty,” with a standard of infallibility, which is completely
inappropriate to man and to the science of knowledge in general.
- Atheism, The Case Against God by George H. Smith, Prometheus Books, 1979, pp. 130-134
The Christian’s entire defense of faith hinges on whether he can present
faith as a “theoretical construct the need for which can be shown.” If one
believes that reason can be shown deficient in some
respect, the door is open for the alternative suggestion that we turn to the
sphere of faith.
The adaptation of Occam’s
razor to the reason-faith controversy consists in demonstrating that
faith, as a supposed method of acquiring knowledge, “cannot be shown to be
necessary for explanatory purposes.” If reason is not inadequate, the door for
faith is never opened—and the subject of faith should
never arise in the first place.
If faith is to gain a foothold, reason must be attacked,
which brings us to the issue of epistemological skepticism. Although skepticism
assumes many forms, it is basically the doctrine that reason is unable to know
or adequately deal with particular aspects of reality. Although skeptics rarely
deny knowledge outright, they may argue that facts cannot be
known with certainty, or that man cannot perceive reality directly, or
that the foundations of knowledge—such as the laws of logic—are arbitrary
constructs of human consciousness and cannot be said to mirror reality.
It is a widespread delusion that Christianity stands as the last
threshold against philosophical skepticism. We are repeatedly
warned that belief in God provides the only antidote to the skeptical
trend in modern philosophy. “In the modern world generally,” writes one
theologian, “the Catholic Church comes forward as the one and only real
champion of reason.”2
This is a gross distortion of truth, both from a historical and
philosophical perspective. Christianity has never been a champion of reason,
nor is it so today. Historically, Christianity has demanded unquestioning
belief in its dogma, and it has subordinated reason to the “handmaiden of
faith.” While reason was permitted to explicate and
defend religious dogma, it was never allowed to question the truth of dogma as
such.
To claim that Christianity somehow provides a bastion of defense against
skepticism is worse than false; it is a reversal of the truth. Christianity
thrives on faith, and faith cannot exist without
skepticism. Skepticism is the precursor of faith; it paves the way for
faith. Through denying the efficacy of reason, skepticism creates the need for
faith. If faith is the epistemological underpinning of Christianity,
skepticism is the epistemological underpinning of faith.
The skeptic and the Christian agree that reason is inadequate in some
respect, and they disagree only with regard to the conclusion to be drawn from this. Where the skeptic says no, the Christian
calls on faith. Where the skeptic wishes to reject some kinds of knowledge as
impossible or uncertain, the Christian seeks to preserve knowledge and
certainty through faith. The skeptic rejects reason; the Christian rejects
reason and then drags in faith. The skeptic and the Christian, united in their
belief in the impotence of reason, are philosophical cousins.
In his struggle to create a sphere of influence for faith, the Christian
must align with skepticism. While he may later denounce and oppose skepticism,
the fact remains that skepticism in one form or another is the method by which
the Christian justifies his faith. As noted earlier, defenses of faith are
memorable for their careful listing of the many things reason allegedly cannot
do. This is the second stage of the faith argument—the denial of spheres of
influence to reason—and it constitutes a crucial step in establishing
Christianity.
It is interesting to examine some of the ways in which Christians use
skepticism to further their goals. Perhaps the most popular method is to
declare that reason must be accepted on faith.
According to D.
The ordinary view is that knowledge comes first and that faith comes afterward. .. . The truth, however, lies in the precise opposite of all this. Faith precedes knowledge and makes knowledge possible. . . . Knowledge is produced when the original sensa are interpreted and organized by epistemological faith. Upon such faith rest not only the lofty creeds of ethics and religion, but also the maxims of daily life. 3
Trueblood also maintains that the existence of a world external to
one’s consciousness cannot be established through
reason and must be believed on faith:
Of course, we all believe in the existence of the “real world,” but it is a wholesome exercise in humility to try to understand why we believe in it. We do so by taking a leap, the leap of epistemological faith. 4
Another common approach is to argue that the basic principles of
science—causality, the uniformity of nature, and the reliability of
reason—cannot be verified through reason and hence enter the domain of faith. “. . . it is apparent,” writes A. F. Smethurst, “that if we look far enough we shall find that
modern science rests upon a foundation of religious belief, and is based upon assumptions
which can only be justified by monotheistic faith. Science rests upon
acts of faith.” 5 Like many Christians, Smethurst
believes that reason must be vindicated through
faith:
What other ground can we find to justify that reliance on the human mind which is essential to science, save faith in God, and in a God of such a character as He Who is revealed by the Christian Revelation? 6
In Studies in the Bible and Science, the fundamentalist H. M.
Morris argues that the uniformity of nature must be accepted
on faith:
The scientific method involves. . . the study of present natural processes. When men attempt to interpret the events of the prehistoric past or the eschatologic future, they must necessarily leave the domain of true science . . . and enter the realm of faith. 7
A survey of religious books, especially those written by Protestants,
will reveal a deep and thorough strain of skepticism with regard to the
efficacy of reason. Reason, we are told, cannot
provide its own foundations, or it cannot support the basic principles of logic
and science, or it cannot give us factual certainty, or it cannot escape the
unreliability of sensory evidence. When the atheist charges that we cannot
make sense out of the concept of God, the Christian replies that this should
not disturb us, because we cannot make sense out of many things. When the
atheist charges that the existence of a supernatural being cannot
be demonstrated through reason, the Christian replies that this must be
expected, because reason is incapable of demonstrating much of anything. What
reason cannot accomplish, however, faith can—and the Christian offers to save
us from a skepticism of his own making.
The Christian is committed to a form of transcendental skepticism. What
real difference is there between the skeptic who believes that man cannot know
reality as it actually is, and the Christian who declares that man cannot know ultimate
reality (i.e., God) as it actually is? How does the skeptic who
bemoans the impotence of reason to comprehend existence differ from the
Christian who preaches the impotence of reason to comprehend the ultimate form
of existence? There are no basic differences here, only differences of degree.
We see, therefore, that Christianity has a vested interest in
skepticism—first, to create a sphere for faith and, second, to preserve the
notion of an unknowable being who lies forever beyond the scope of reason. For
the Christian to oppose skepticism is ideological suicide. The Christian who
postures as an enemy of skepticism is biting the hand that feeds him.
Generally considered, a defense of reason is an attack on skepticism.
More specifically, our defense of reason shall be an attack on skepticism as
employed by the Christian to create a sphere of influence for faith.
- Atheism, The Case Against God by George H. Smith, Prometheus Books, 1979, pp. 127-130
Scepticism by SIMON BLACKBURN
Source: The
Enlightenment, The by GORDON
Source: A Dictionary of Sociology, 1/1/1998
Debate
Descartes started pitted skepticism against faith by Chauncey Mabe
Source: Oakland Tribune, 12/23/2008.
DESCARTES
AND SKEPTICISM.(Rene Descartes) by GRENE, MARJORIE
Source: The Review of Metaphysics,
3/1/1999.
http://wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/SKEPT.HTM