From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 
Date: Sat, 19 Oct 1996 05:33:17 -0400

Oliver Sparrow wrote:
> 
> In other words, I suspect that the original poster's proposal, to consider
> emotional states and evolution, is an interesting one. I personally would
> be concrned by the 'how' word, but if he can do it, he should. If it's useful,
> it will spread; like pimples in a gymnasium.
> 
>   Oliver Sparrow
>   ohgs@chatham.demon.co.uk


Ah yes.  The 'how' word.  Here goes.
_______________________________________________

Rational Negativism: A Divergent Theory of Emotional Disorder

Objective: To account for self-worth related
emotion (i.e., needs for love, acceptance, moral integrity, 
recognition, achievement, purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional 
disorder (e.g., depression, suicide, etc.) within the context 
of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to synthesize natural science 
and the humanities; i.e., to answer the question: 'Why is there 
a species of naturally selected organism expending huge quantities 
of effort and energy on the survivalistically bizarre objective of 
maximizing self-worth?'

Observation: The species in which rationality
is most developed is also the one in which individuals have the
greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self-
worth, often going to extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g.,
Evel Knievel, celibate monks, self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).

Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric
stability (i.e., maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).

Synopsis: In much the manner reasoning allows
for the subordination of lower emotional concerns and values (pain,
fear, anger, sex, etc.) to more global concerns (concern
for the self as a whole), so too, these more global concerns and
values can themselves become reevaluated and subordinated to other
more global, more objective considerations. And if this is so,
and assuming that emotional disorder emanates from a deficiency
in self-worth resulting from precisely this sort of experiencially
based reevaluation, then it can reasonably be construed as a natural
malfunction resulting from one's rational faculties functioning
a tad too well.

Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct,
then some explanation for the relative "normalcy" of
most individuals would seem necessary. This is accomplished simply
by postulating different levels or degrees of consciousness. From
this perspective, emotional disorder would then be construed as
a valuative affliction resulting from an increase in semantic
content in the engram indexed by the linguistic expression, "I
am insignificant", which all persons of common sense "know"
to be true, but which the "emotionally disturbed" have
come to "realize", through abstract thought, devaluing
experience, etc.

Implications: So-called "free will"
and the incessant activity presumed to emanate from it is simply
the insatiable appetite we all have for self-significating experience
which, in turn, is simply nature's way of attempting to counter
the objectifying influences of our rational faculties. This also
implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking"
artifact is probably going to be a diesel.

(Quotation)
Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than 
critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from 
without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which 
eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, 
the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on 
and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding 
phenomenon for minds? (A. M. Turing).


Additional Implications: Since the explanation
I have proposed amounts to the contention that the most rational
species (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending
the formalism of nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via intentional 
self-concern, i.e., the prudence program) it can reasonably be
construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of
Lucas/Godel (1961). Not only does this imply that the aforementioned
artifact probably won't be a computer, but it would also explain
why a question such as "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally
Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981) has led to controversy, in that
it presupposes the possibility of an absolute answer to that which
can only be addressed in comparative (non-formalizable) terms.  
Finally, the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or metajustification 
for comparative approaches in epistemology (explanationism, plausiblism, etc.)

(Quotation)
The short answer (to Lucas/Godel) is that, although it is 
established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has 
only been stated, without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to 
human intellect  (A. M. Turing).

(Quotation)
What kind of algorhythm, then, might mathematicians be 
running? Algorhythms for trying to stay alive (D. C. Dennett).


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